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Abstract 
 
We live in an age where science and technology rapidly expand the boundaries of what is 
possible. One such area is the branch of technology called robotics, which deals with the 
construction and design of robots. However, as robots become more advanced and acquiring 
more humanlike features and capabilities, it is not uncommon to speculate, both in the real 
world and in fiction, what may happen if robots become too advanced and humanlike. These 
speculations are developed on in Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids 
Dream of Electric Sheep?. Not only do the two narratives explore how robots and androids 
change the world for the better or worse, but also how the humanlike behaviour and 
appearance of the artificial beings evoke empathy or dyspathy amongst the human characters. 
This essay will discuss why the human characters start to feel empathy or dyspathy toward 
the artificial beings that appear in I, Robot and Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The subject of how individuals react towards fictional and nonhuman beings is a provocative 
and widely discussed subject and there are many theories that attempt to develop responses to 
this issue. In recent years, there has been an increased interest especially in the field of 
robotics. Scientists and roboticists have started to ask whether robots are or will be capable of 
acquiring humanlike intelligence, to feel and express emotions, how these should be designed 
and if they should be assigned certain humanlike rights. In addition, the question of how and 
why humans can develop feelings towards synthetic life, such as empathy and love, as well as 
negative emotions such as fear and hatred, is also incorporated in the debate. These topics are 
examined in the books I, Robot by Isaac Asimov (1950) and Do Androids Dream of Electric 
Sheep? by Philip K. Dick (1968), both of which explore the empathy and dyspathy that may 
develop towards artificial beings and the relationship that is formed between man and 
machine. 
The stories of the two books take place in hypothetical futures of Earth each with 
different environments in terms of political and social climate. In I, Robot, the reader follows 
the robopsychologist Susan Calvin of U.S.Robot and Mechanical Men throughout nine short 
stories, and through her interviews with a journalist the readers get to know about bizarre 
events that marked the development of robots in the universe of I, Robot. Initially the short 
stories were published separately in pulp science-fiction magazines in the 1940s and were 
later brought together in 1950 into one unified book with some minor edits in order to make 
the stories more coherent, such as introducing Susan as the narrator (Warrick 54-57). While 
robot morality is the centre of this work, Asimov stated that he also wrote the short stories to 
challenge the stereotypical trope of robots rebelling against their masters, which he termed 
“the Frankenstein complex” (Asimov on Science Fiction 162; Warrick 55). He wanted to 
show the advantages of robots in society, that they could be friends and work for the good of 
humanity, instead of destroying it. To achieve this, the robots are programmed to follow the 
Three Laws (or Rules) of Robotics: 
1. A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human 
being to come to harm. 2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human 
beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law. 3. A robot 
must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict 
with the First or Second Law. (Perkowitz 31-32) 
Brand 2 
 
 
Apart from protecting humanity from rampaging robots, the Three Laws act as a recurring 
plot device and as a trigger for creating complex moral conflicts in the robots, which the 
humans consequently have to decipher and avert. 
In contrast to Isaac Asimov’s optimistic version of Earth in I, Robot, Philip K. Dick’s 
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?
1
 is much more pessimistic. In the future of a 
devastated Earth, the reader follows the bounty hunter Rick Deckard who is tasked with 
hunting down six androids, called andys, that have fled from the colonised world of Mars. 
These androids are so humanlike in outward appearance that the only thing that separates 
them from humans is their (assumed) lack of empathy. Armed with a questionable empathy 
test called the Voigt-Kampf test, Rick must uncover who is android and who is human, as the 
androids are perceived as dangerous and a threat to humanity. However, this is easier said 
than done as Rick starts to empathise with his targets and doubts whether the human and 
android distinction is as simple as he has made it out to be. 
Even though the main focus of the two books is on how technology can change the 
world for the better or worse, the recurring theme of how the human characters come to 
empathise or despite artificial beings is central. This essay will examine why the human 
characters start to develop empathy and or dyspathy toward the androids of Do Androids 
Dream and the robots of I, Robot. By examining how empathy and dyspathy function 
between humans in general, I will argue that there are three conventions that also apply in a 
similar manner towards artificial beings. After providing the definitions and the historical 
summaries for empathy, dyspathy, and artificial beings, I will first argue that empathy or 
dyspathy can be elicited by artificial beings as a result of how realistic their outward 
appearance and behaviour are. Secondly, I will argue that dyspathy can be formed towards 
artificial beings as a result of humankind’s tendency to classify each other as ‘us’ and ‘them,’ 
as ‘we’ and the ‘Other.’ Lastly, I will argue that the human tendency to Otherise people, 
something which triggers dyspathy, can be overcome and be transform into empathy when 
the human characters realise that the ‘Others,’ in this case, androids and robots, are not so 
different after all. 
 
2 Empathy and Dyspathy 
 
                                                                        
1
 The primary source Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is from now on referred to as Do Androids Dream. 
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The word empathy, which is an essential feature in human morality, originates from the 
German equivalent term Einfühlung, which was coined in the late nineteenth century by the 
German aesthetician Theodor Lipps and was translated into English by the psychologist 
Edward Titchener in 1909 (Keen 2006 209; Misselhorn 106). Since its formation, the concept 
of empathy has had fluctuations in terms of popularity in the scientific community. Presently, 
empathy has gained a significant amount of interest in multiple fields, such as “psychology, 
medicine, neuroscience, and psychoanalysis” (Hollan 385), one of many the reasons for this 
being as a result of the recent discoveries of so-called mirror neurons in the human brain
2
 
along with the progression of the capability to trace chemicals and hormones in the brain with 
fMRI scans (Keen “A Theory of Narrative Empathy”; “Sin”). According to these discoveries, 
“[s]cience shows we humans are hardwired to have empathy…[that] kindness is in our 
physiology” (“Sin”). Empathy has also gained relevance in the field of robotics as researchers 
have started to discuss if and how robots should be able to show empathy, as well the moral, 
ethical, and epistemological dimensions. 
The everyday definition of empathy is “the ability to ‘put oneself into another’s 
shoes’” (Misselhorn 105) and feel the same as that person which can be triggered by seeing, 
hearing or even reading about another’s situation (Keen 2006 4-5). The ability to place 
oneself in another’s situation, or rather, to project oneself onto another and experience the 
same emotions, is formed by multiple cognitive and affective processes. Misselhorn defines 
these processes as: “knowing what a person is feeling, feeling what another person is feeling, 
and responding compassionately to another person’s distress” (105). As such, empathy can 
either in narrow definition be seen as a purely cognitive process (what happens in the brain, 
knowing and feeling another person’s emotions) or, more broadly, also involve an emotional 
process which results in the person giving a compassionate response or reaction towards 
another’s suffering. Additionally, according to Vignemont, humans do not empathise all of 
the time and empathy is far from being an automatic process or voluntary action, but instead 
relies on several contextual factors to be triggered (184), such as what type of emotion the 
target experiences, the familiarity the empathiser know of said emotion and the context of the 
situation. This essay will treat empathy in a broad sense which “include[s] all dimensions” 
(106), and which both encompasses the cognitive aspects (what happens in the brain) and the 
emotional aspect, which together result in an empathetic response of another’s situation and 
acts of kindness and friendship. 
                                                                        
2
 The mirror neurons allow us to imitate others’ movements and facial expressions and thus can relate and 
“recognize the emotions of others” (Vignemont 182). 
Brand 4 
 
 
While empathy is defined as a trait that encourages goodness and enables oneself to 
imagine another person’s or being’s feelings, dyspathy is defined as “antipathy, aversion, 
dislike” (“dyspathy, n.”). Misselhorn utilises the term dyspathy in one of her essays 
synonymously to the negative feelings that are elicited by or towards artificial beings mainly 
due to their outward appearance and behaviour, described as “more than just apathy—a lack 
of feeling; it is a distinctly negative, aversive feeling towards androids” (103). This essay will 
use the term dyspathy in a similar way, but will also use the term to discuss the hostility that 
occurs towards androids and robots for other reasons than their appearance and realism in 
behaviour. 
 
3 Androids and Robots 
 
According to Asimov, the main unifying characteristics of robots and androids are that “both 
[terms] refer to artificial human beings” (“Asimov on Science Fiction” 71). As a result, they 
are often used synonymously and may be confused, even though they are essentially 
different. The term ‘android,’ which was first introduced in the novel The Cometeers (1950) 
by Jack Williamson, means ‘manlike’ and applies to artificial beings created from organic 
substances and which are close or nearly indistinguishable from a real human (71; 
“Androids”). The term ‘robot,’ which was established by the Czech play R.U.R. in 1921, 
means ‘slave’ and is applied to beings created by mechanical means and can take either a 
nonhuman or humanlike appearance (71; “Robot”). In short, androids can be seen as a 
subtype of robots, defined as more humanlike in outward appearance, while robots often have 
a more visible mechanical nature. Despite this difference between the two, this essay will 
treat androids and robots in a similar way following Misselhorn’s definition: as beings that, 
while not human, may still manage to trigger empathy and dyspathy in the human characters, 
which are “normally only shown towards our conspecifics” (102). 
While the words ‘robot’ and ‘android’ are rather young words, formed in the early 
and mid-twentieth century, the concept of artificially created beings is not an invention of the 
modern era. There have been plenty of such beings depicted in fiction, created for various 
reasons and purposes: as protectors, slaves, lovers, weapons, to mention a few. Many of these 
tropes can be found in old myths, depicting the common themes, benefits and downsides 
central to the concept of artificial life. For example, the Greek myth of the brazen giant Talos, 
who guarded the shores of Create, shows that artificial beings could be created to be 
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protectors and weapons (Asimov, “Asimov on Science Fiction” 155; Dinello 37). The golden 
women created by the Greek god Hephaistos, who helped him in his forge, show that 
artificial beings can benefit, serve and be of use for humans (Asimov, “Asimov on Science 
Fiction” 145; Perkowitz 18). The legend of Pygmalion, which tells about Pygmalion falling 
in love with his own statue, only to have it brought to life by Aphrodite, depicts for some a 
desire to bring life to the dead and to create the perfect woman (Dinello 37). 
While ancient myths depict plenty of stories about artificial beings, the Alchemists of 
the Renaissance were also fascinated by the thought of controlling life and nature. Apart from 
wanting to create gold and a longevity potion, they sought “to create a creature of flesh and 
blood without female participation” (37), which led to the idea of the Homunculus, miniature 
humanlike creatures. In Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s Dr Faust the main character Doctor 
Faust, along with the help of the devil, creates a Homunculus who desires to become fully 
human (38). The sixteenth century myth of the Golem, created out of clay, follows the same 
concept as Talos, functioning as a protector and a weapon (38). However, when the Golem 
entered literature, its nature transformed “from servant/protector to revengeful monster” (38), 
introducing the more complicated relationship between man and machine, that of master and 
slave and fear of being harmed by one’s own creation (45). 
The philosophical aspect was introduced in to the field of robotics in the seventeenth 
century when the philosopher Descartes (who was also interested in robots, called 
automatons, during his time) formulated his famous dictum “I think, therefore I am,” and 
subsequently claimed that: 
[A]nimals and humans are nothing more than machines that operate by 
mechanical principles. Humans, however, have a dual nature because they also 
have “rational souls” that make them unique among living things; it is why 
humans alone can say, “I think, therefore I am.” (Perkowitz 55) 
This dictum, along “with his mechanistic view of the physical world…launched the modern 
era of automata”  (Dinello 35) and have since been a source of inspiration in the continuing 
exploration of the mind, body and soul, as well as what makes humans different from other 
beings such as robots. 
While old myths, legends and concepts have had significant impact on the formation 
of artificial beings, the modern creation and perception of androids and robots derive from 
two more recent sources: Frankenstein: the Modern Prometheus (1818) by Mary Shelley 
(Asimov, “Asimov on Science Fiction” 19, 105), and the drama R.U.R. (1921) written by 
Karl Čapek, which deals with mass production of living creatures called ‘robots,’ an old 
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Czech word that means ‘forced labour,’ or simply, slave (Perkowitz 25-26). These robots 
spurred the deep-rooted fear that robots would seek to overcome humanity itself, and which 
has since then been a prevailing notion of artificial beings. 
The many forms and roles which robots have taken throughout the history of fiction 
show how the relationship between man and robot has developed, as well as what may be the 
primary reasons for empathy and dyspathy being elicited by artificial beings. For example, 
Pygmalion’s statue, Galatea, suggest that something that looks almost identical to a human, 
can trigger feelings of empathy and compassion in human beings to the extent of falling in 
love with it. The Golem and the robots of R.U.R show that the slave/master relationship, 
alongside the fear of one’s creation going out of control, cause dyspathy. Frankenstein’s 
monster showed that even if an artificial being may have a humanlike appearance, it may 
evoke dyspathy it is “an abomination who exists in a liminal realm between the living and the 
dead simultaneously provoking sympathy and disgust” (Brenton par. 2). In I, Robot and Do 
Androids Dream, all of these different aspects of how empathy and dyspathy are elicited by 
the artificial beings and triggered in the human characters can be observed, one due to the 
anthropomorphism and behaviour of the robots and androids. 
 
4 Anthropomorphic, Uncanny and Flawed 
 
The first aspect that triggers empathy and dyspathy in the human characters in the two novels 
is based on how humanlike the robots’ and androids’ appearance and behaviour is. Humans 
most readily empathise with those who seem like us (Keen, “Empathy and the novel” x), and 
“a more human-like physical appearance of a robot can increase the empathy expressed by 
people towards it [as i]t is easier to relate to a robot that shares physical similarities with a 
human than with one that resembles a machine” (Zlotowski par. III A). Furthermore, it is not 
only the degree of anthropomorphisation that affects how humans will empathizes with a 
robot or not, but other dimensions as well, “such as movement [63], verbal communication 
[64], [65], emotions [66], gestures [67] and intelligence [68], [69]” (par. III A). However, 
according to Misselhorn, empathy can also be triggered by objects that have a low degree of 
human resemblance. Robots do not have to be entirely humanlike to evoke empathy, but only 
need to possess a couple of anthropomorphic characteristics, as computer scientists have 
noted that humans easily anthropomorphise all kinds of machines (par. II A). This can be 
seen with the nursemaid robot Robbie from the short story “Robbie” in I, Robot. 
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Robbie, being one of the earlier robot models in the universe of I, Robot, is a rather 
stereotypical robot - he is made out of metal, has an anthropomorphic frame (such as a head, 
torso, legs, feet and hands), has red glowing eyes, produces clanking sounds and can only 
communicate with the help of pantomime language. His primary purpose is to be a caretaker 
of the little girl Gloria and they become very close friends. However, Gloria’s mother, Mrs. 
Weston, persuades Mr. Weston to get rid of Robbie because she is afraid of him going out of 
control, even though he is unable to do so because of the Three Laws. When Gloria finds out 
that Robbie is gone, she stops eating and is constantly unhappy. Not knowing what to do, 
Mrs. Weston asks her “Why do you cry Gloria? Robbie was only a machine, just a nasty old 
machine. He wasn’t alive at all” (11), to which she replies “He was not no machine... He was 
a person just like you and me and he was my friend” (11). Despite his nonhuman appearance, 
Gloria still believes that he is alive, a person, whom she deeply cares about and sees as a 
close friend. This belief is further reinforced when Gloria encounters ‘the talking robot’ on 
her quest to find out where Robbie is. She asks it if it has seen Robbie, describing her friend 
as “[a] robot just like you, except he can’t talk, of course, and - looks like a real person” 
(emphasis added 18). This attachment to the less than realistic Robbie could first and 
foremost be explained due to by Gloria being a child, as children in general perceive the 
world as ‘alive’ in a higher degree than adults (Kang 23), as “the boundary line between the 
animate and the inanimate is not yet set” (38). Gloria is more willing to perceive Robbie as 
something that is alive, while her mother, who is an adult, is more reluctant. Susan reinforces 
this view, as “it was easier for [Gloria] at the age of fifteen than at eight” (23) to let go of 
Robbie, suggesting that age may have played a part. 
On the other hand, the empathy that Gloria feels towards Robbie does not only 
depend on her being a child, but is also ironically due to his low degree of human 
resemblance. This notion can also be illustrated by the famous real world robot Kismet, who 
was not designed to look like a human “because an imperfect simulation of humanity can be 
disturbing” (Perkowitz 178), and was instead designed with “exaggerated, clownlike 
features—big blue eyes, prominent lips, and conspicuous animal-like ears” (178). According 
to Perkowitz, Kismet’s simple design engages people that interact with it, feeling empathy for 
it (179). In a similar manner as Kismet, Robbie’s lack of human realism does not seem to 
make him unpleasant, but on the contrary, makes him likeable and elicits empathy in the 
human characters, especially Gloria. In addition, robots with little human resemblance that 
are also represented as “benign, servile, and silly…[repress] people’s essential fear of them” 
(Kang 40), much in a similar manner to how the robots R2D2 and C-3PO in the Star Wars 
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movies are portrayed (40). Robbie can likewise be ascribed these attributes, as he is 
represented as benign (8), he is quick to obey and serve and at times may act silly because of 
his slightly comical way of communicating, suggesting “in the same way as cute children, 
unable to properly ‘use their words’ but lovable regardless” (Corcoran). 
While Robbie elicits empathy in Gloria because of her young age and his 
anthropomorphic characteristics, the androids in Do Androids Dream seemingly trigger 
dyspathy in the human characters despite their extremely humanlike exterior. Thinking 
logically, it should be much easier to empathise with them, as humans most readily empathise 
with those who seem like us. This inability to feel empathy towards such realistic beings can 
be explained through the concept of the ‘uncanny.’ 
The concept of the ‘uncanny’ was first used by the psychologist Ernst Jentsch On the 
Psychology of the Uncanny in 1906 and was later further developed by Freud in his essay 
“The Uncanny” in 1919 (Misselhorn 104). In short, the uncanny can be summarized as the 
strange feeling and “uncertainty as to whether something one faces is an inanimate object or 
living being, the insecurity being heightened when a thing not only looks like an animate 
creature but also behaves like one” (Kang 22). Roboticist Masahiro Mori formulated a similar 
theory called the “uncanny valley” in 1970 which deals with the same concept, but is 
specifically applied to robots and robot design. His theory suggests that when a robot 
becomes more and more humanlike, it elicits more and more empathy from humans, until 
there is an instance when “the mismatch between their form, interactivity, and motion quality 
elicits a sense of unease” (Riek, “Real-time Empathy”). 
The androids in Do Androids Dream seemingly trigger Mori’s ‘uncanny’ theory 
because they do at times not live up to the standards of simulating life and human behaviour, 
even though their appearance is indistinguishable from that of humans. As some of the 
characters are introduced to the rogue androids that have yet not been killed by Rick Deckard, 
they take note of a feeling of coldness. For example, when Rick meets Luba Luft, he notes 
“[h]er tone held cold reserve — and that other cold, which he had encountered in so many 
androids. Always the same: great intellect, ability to accomplish much, but also this” (79). 
The bounty hunter Phil Resch also takes note of this strange feeling of uneasiness, as he 
describes the android Polokov as “cold. Extremely cerebral and calculating; detached” (93). 
While their outward appearance does not elicit dyspathy, as nothing really separates them 
from humans in general, the coldness puts the characters off. Brenton describes this 
occurrence as even though a robot has a high degree of external realism, they can still trigger 
the feeling of the uncanny, especially if the outward realism does not match up with the 
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behaviour (Brenton par. 3). This is also further enforced in the description of the android Pris 
Straton by Isadore (at the time he did not know that she was an android): 
Now that her initial fear had diminished, something else had begun to emerge 
from her. Something more strange. And, he thought, deplorable. A coldness. 
Like, he thought, a breath from the vacuum between inhabited worlds, in fact 
from nowhere: it was not what she did or said but what she did not do and say. 
(emphasis added 54) 
The more realistic the outward appearance is of an artificial being, the expectations on the 
behaviour and motional realism the higher the expectations (par. 4.2). If an android has too 
humanlike attributes, it will “evoke expectations that [it] might not be able to fulfil” 
(Bartneck par. 2). In the case of the androids in Do Androids Dream, they elicit dyspathy in 
the human characters because their behaviour does not live up to their high degree of outward 
realism. 
In a similar manner to the androids in Do Androids Dream, the android
3
 Stephen 
Byerley in the short story “Evidence” in I, Robot shows that dyspathy and the uncanny can be 
triggered despite his humanlike appearance. However, compared to the androids in Do 
Androids Dream, the dyspathy towards Stephen is only triggered in the human characters 
after Byerley has been exposed as an android. In contrast to the other robots in the novel, 
Stephen Byerley is indistinguishable from a real human, and no one knows that he is a robot. 
He is a lawyer who is running for election to become mayor of one of the great regions of 
Earth, and it is generally believed that he will win the election. His extremely realistic 
appearance and behaviour doesn’t trigger dyspathy like the androids of Do Androids Dream, 
as “the humans [he] encounter[ed] h[ad] no reason not to believe [him] to be human” 
(Corcoran), and that “[a] highly anthropomorphic and intelligent robot is likely to be 
perceived to be more animate and possibly also more likeable [than other robots]” (Bartneck 
72). However, this changes when he becomes the subject of a thorough investigation by the 
politician Francis Quinn. While talking to Alfred Lanning, the founder of U.S.Robot and 
Mechanical Men, he tells him that his investigation showed that Stephen has never been seen 
drinking, eating or sleeping (173), and points out that “the man is quite inhuman” (173), 
arguing that he is a robot in disguise. The rumours start to spread, and only then is Byerley 
met with dyspathy, hostility and anger by the people in the narrative. This is partially due to 
the general attitude towards robots amongst the humans in I, Robot, as robots are banned 
                                                                        
3
 Stephen Byerley is labelled as a robot in the short story, but his realistic appearance would logically classify 
him as an android. 
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from Earth for various reasons. However, like the androids in Do Androids Dream, Stephen 
Byerley also triggers the uncanny because he does not live up to the expectations his outward 
appearance establishes. In the end, Stephen Byerley manages to convince the voters that he is 
a human by punching a man, which robots are not allowed to do, and wins the election. By 
proving that his assumed flaws are false, such as not being able to eat, sleep and drink, and 
most importantly, being able to harm a human, he is again seen as a human. That this has 
succeeded is evident as he manages to become Regional Co-ordinator of the Regions of Earth 
(in other words, the president of Earth) (197). 
As can be seen above, the external appearance of the artificial beings can affect to 
what degree empathy and dyspathy will be elicited in the human characters; robots with a low 
degree of human resemblance are more likely to be likeable as “early humans who interpreted 
ambiguous shapes as human [anthropomorphisation] minimized their risks of being killed by 
enemies and maximized their chances of making friends” (Zlotowski par. I A). On the other 
hand, the more humanlike androids and robots have a more difficult time convincing and 
simulate human behaviour and characteristics, and thus tend to evoke dyspathy in the 
characters. Only when the human simulation is flawless is empathy elicited. However, while 
the outward realism and behaviour of robots and androids plays a large part in how humans 
initially react and feel towards artificial beings, this is just a minor dimension of the many 
aspects that trigger empathy and dyspathy, as it is important to take the contextual aspects 
into consideration too. One such aspect is how robots and android interact and are treated by 
humans. In the case of I, Robot and Do Androids Dream, the robots and the androids are met 
with prejudice and fear, being stand-ins for the suppressed and shunned, envisioned as taking 
the role of the ‘Other’ because they do not fit into the norms and binary categories of society. 
 
5 Otherisation and Fear  
 
As previously stated, it is a part of human physiology to feel empathy thanks to the mirror 
neurons, the chemicals and the hormones in the human brain. Despite this, humans still do 
bad things to others. As regards, the androids and robots in I, Robot and Do Androids Dream 
are continuously met with prejudice, hate and fear from a majority of the human characters. 
In the previous section, this was attributed to the appearance of the androids and robots, 
which could both cause empathy or dyspathy to be elicited. However, in both I, Robot and Do 
Brand 11 
 
 
Androids Dream, there is another reason for them being targets of dyspathy from the human 
characters – Otherisation. 
 Otherisation, or more commonly called Othering, is a process that occurs when a 
dominant group of people or society excludes another group of people who do not fit into 
said society (“Sin”; Embrick 1357). The process of Othering has often “historically been used 
to justify the mistreatment and oppression of one group of people by another” (Embrick 
1357), and the ‘Other’ are often seen as beasts or subhuman (“Sin”; Embrick 1357). 
According to Jines, the idea of the ‘Other’ has close ties to empathy and dyspathy, as 
empathy developed “to only [extend] to the tribe, to blood ties” (qtd. in Rifkin 447‐48), and 
those who were “outside of this group was the alien ‘Other’” (qtd. in Rifkin 453) were 
regarded “with a range of emotions, but without empathy” (Keen, “A Theory of Narrative 
Empathy” 214). In I, Robot and Do Androids Dream the robots and androids are the ones 
who are the ‘Other,’ and are met with dyspathy by the human characters.  
 Both Do Androids Dream and I, Robot share a couple similar reasons for the 
Otherisation of the androids and robots. One of these reasons is that the robots and the 
androids are deemed to be dangerous, and are thus not allowed to be on Earth amongst 
humans. For example, in Do Androids Dream the humans are afraid of the androids because 
they are claimed to be smarter (23), ruthless, and lack the ability to feel empathy, and are thus 
dangerous to other beings. To ensure humanity’s safety, the bounty hunters are tasked to hunt 
down and “retire” the androids that flee to Earth. In I, Robot the humans are afraid that the 
robots may at any moment go out of control or that they will render humans useless. To avert 
robots going berserk and to keep them as obedient servants the Three Laws were invented 
and programmed into the robots. However, despite these safety measures, there is a lingering 
fear amongst the humans throughout the two narratives: either that the Three Laws in I, Robot 
may not be as solid set as they have assumed them to be, or that the androids in Do Androids 
Dream are too humanlike to be found out. These fears result in Otherisation of the robots and 
the androids.    
Another shared reason for Otherisation to be formed towards the androids and robots 
in I, Robot and Do Androids Dream is that they do not fit into any of the binary categories of 
each society. Binary categories are commonly used in communities and societies to “put 
together a structure of reality…to make sense of the world by organizing things in a series of 
dual oppositions such as day/night…living/dead, man/woman…safe/dangerous” (Kang 29). 
Entities encountered that do not fit into these dual categories, such as the androids and robot 
being neither alive nor dead, human nor machine, “pose a danger to the community as a 
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whole, as [they threaten] to undermine the foundations of its shared reality, potentially 
throwing it into a conceptual chaos” (30). In Do Androids Dream the norm of human society 
is to follow the religion of Mercerism, a religion that is solely based around the concept of 
empathy. Because of the androids inability to feel empathy, they are not able to be a part of 
Mercerism, and are thus excluded from human society. In I, Robot the robots are also 
Otherised as they threaten the way how human society works. In the narrative there are two 
organisations that have ‘anti-robot’ attitudes: The Fundamentalist and the ‘Society for 
Humanity.’ The Fundamentalists are people who “had not adapted themselves to what had 
once been called the Atomic Age” (186) and are “Simple-Lifers” (186) and solely hate robots 
because they fear them, while the ‘Society for Humanity’ ensures that robots are not allowed 
to work on Earth as they enables “unfair labour competition” (205). The robots have been 
banned from Earth presumably because of these two organisations, which sugests that the 
Otherisation of the robots is due to humans’ fear of change and being rendered useless.  
The process of Otherisation results in dyspathy in the human characters, which is 
expressed in an alienating behaviour towards the androids and the robots. In I, Robot, this is 
apparent in multiple ways, as the robots, according to Paul D. Lee “tend to highlight very real 
racial problems…the robots themselves act as stand-ins for the racial minorities” (31). For 
example, the way in which the robots are addressed and treated by the humans, as well as 
how the robots refer to the humans, show the unequal relationship between the two. In the 
short story “Runaround,” the robot scientists Gregory Powell and Michael Donovan are 
forced to get help from six old robots to retrieve a more advanced robot called Speedy, who 
has gone out of control. When Powell activates one of them, “The monster’s head bent 
slowly and the eyes fixed themselves on Powell. Then…he grated, ‘Yes, Master!’” (29). 
Donovan explains that the robots have a “good, healthy slave complex [programmed] into the 
damned machines” (29).  
While the robots show their subordination by using words such as master, the humans 
continually impose their dominance on the robots by repeatedly calling the robots derogatory 
names and insulting them. For example, in the short story “Little Lost Robot,” the robot 
which disappears is treated badly by his superior, being called names “with every verbal 
appearance of revulsion, disdain, and disgust” (125). Another example is when the characters 
use the word ‘boy’ when talking to the robots. Gloria calls Robbie boy (2), Powell and 
Donovan do so towards Speedy in “Runaround” (35), Susan in “Little Lost Robot” (133, 137-
38) and in “Escape!” (149). Lee states that this indicates certain racist undertones, indicating 
that the humans impose “their own inherent sense of superiority by calling the machines 
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‘boys’” (qtd. in Scholes and Rabkin 188). These racists undertones are reminiscent of how 
black slaves were treated and addressed, as “the white slave master often exercised his 
authority over the black male slave, by depriving him of all attributes…treating him as a 
child” (Hall 262), and one such way was to call them ‘boys’ or ‘girls.’  
In a similar manner to the robots in I, Robot, the androids in Do Androids Dream are 
also the subject of Otherisation. Apart from being feared because of them being dangerous, 
they are created to be slaves for humans. As a result of the nuclear World War Terminus, a 
majority of mankind has been forced to emigrate to Mars to start a new life. To make life 
easier on the new planet, the emigrants are each offered a custom made robot. During a 
commercial, the announcer says that the androids can be seen as slaves, illustrated as 
“duplicates [of] the halcyon days of the pre-Civil War Southern states! Either as a body 
servants or tireless field hands, the custom-tailored humanoid robot” (13). While the robots of 
I, Robot are closely supervised and controlled, the androids in Do Androids Dream revolt and 
actively seek to become free from humanity, dreaming of a better life on Earth (145). 
However, on Earth, they are not welcome. They are shunned and hunted by bounty hunters, 
seen as dangerous “murderous illegal aliens” (108), beings that are not able to feel empathy 
and are thus a threat to human society. They are out of place, not fitting in with the norms of 
human society. According to Hall, when such ‘anomalies’ or ‘matter out of place’ spring up 
in a society, it results in attempts “to sweep [the anomaly] up, throw it out, [and] restore the 
place to order” (qtd. in Kristeva 1982). This is what the bounty hunters are for, working as “a 
barrier which keeps the two distinct” (112), strengthening Otherisation and dyspathy towards 
them.  
One part of the process of Otherisation is that those who are targeted are dehumanized 
and seen as inferiors or beasts. In Do Androids Dream, the androids are, apart from being 
seen as dangerous aliens, deemed worth less than animals. Because of the World War 
Terminus, which wiped out most of the animal life on Earth, owning an animal is a sign of 
status in human society (depending on what animal you own and how many), as well as a 
way to show one’s empathetic disposition. Iran, Rick’s wife, explicitly states this: “You know 
how people are about not taking care of an animal; they consider it immoral and anti-
empathetic” (9). Because of this wide spread opinion, in combination with real life animals 
being so rare and expensive, people often buy and take care of electric animals as if they were 
real animals. However, while the humans love both the real and the electric animals, the 
androids are not in the humans’ “range of empathetic identification” (112). The androids are 
seen as below animals, even electric ones, as exemplified by them being hunted and killed, 
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while the electric animals are treated with love and care. When Rick meets the android 
Garland, he confirms this, saying that “It’s a chance anyway, breaking free and coming here 
to Earth where we’re not even considered animals. Where every worm and wood louse is 
considered more desirable than all of us put together” (97). This idea that the androids are 
inferior to animals, even electric ones, is also mentioned in the conversation between Pris, 
Roy and Isadore (127-28). 
While dyspathy is formed towards the androids and robots by the human characters as 
a result of Otherisation and fear, there are those of the human characters that start to realise 
that the distinction between human and machine may not be as clear set as it is assumed to 
be, resulting in empathy being formed instead. 
 
6 More Human than Human 
 
While dyspathy is widespread in the universes of I, Robot and Do Androids Dream as a result 
of Otherisation, the androids and robots still manage to elicit empathy amongst a few of the 
human characters. The reason for this lies in the realization that robots and androids, in the 
end, are not so different from us humans, or that they do not deserve to be treated in the way 
that they are. Otherisation, which suppresses empathy for another group or person, can be 
broken (“Sin”). This can be explained in the same way as we can explain how soldiers, who 
fight in close range, often have problem to kill because of “a natural tendency in themselves 
to view the enemy as equally human” (Moses 136). Kathleen Taylor gives another similar 
example: a man from the SS in WWII was to kill some Jewish children. He had to take the 
hand of a little girl, and suddenly couldn’t kill her and the other children. His empathy broke 
through. If the cues are sufficiently strong, dyspathy can be reversed (“Sin”). The same 
process can be observed in relation to the androids and robots in I, Robot and Do Androids 
Dream. Even though the majority of the human characters believe that they are just simple, 
dangerous machines, there are moments where the robots and androids show humanlike 
qualities: some hope for independence and freedom, some are able to reason, some display 
the ability to feel emotions such as love, anger, fear, friendship, and empathy. At times they 
may even appear more human than humans themselves. 
In I, Robot there are mainly two persons who actively empathise with the robots – 
Susan Calvin and Gloria. In the beginning of the short story “Robbie” the reader gets to know 
how Gloria and Robbie interact: they play hide and seek and Gloria tells him fairy tales. The 
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interaction between the two shows that Robbie is not an unemotional machine. This is 
reinforced later on in the story when Gloria is about to be crushed by a tractor. In the nick of 
time Robbie saves her and “wound about the little girl gently and lovingly, and his eyes 
glowed a deep, deep red” (22). It could be argued that Robbie only saved Gloria because the 
First Law imposes that he must, but the description of Robbie’s reaction when he sees Gloria 
before she is put in danger (21) shows that he does care deeply for her and would probably 
have saved her even if the First Law did not exist. Additionally, as Gloria stops to play with 
children her age, her mother becomes worried about her (8). George Weston says, in an 
attempt to make his wife less worried, that she could regard Robbie as a dog. He reasons that 
the love Gloria feels for Robbie is the same as a child or person feel for a dog, that he has 
“seen hundreds of children who would rather have their dog than their father” (8). Robbie 
seemingly suggests that robots in I, Robot may not just machines, but really have other 
hidden sides to themselves.  
Susan Calvin is also one of the few human characters in I, Robot who empathises with 
the robots. She says that she “like[s] robots…considerably better than…human beings” (196), 
and states that robots are better than humans. She also argues that The Three Laws, which 
apart from imposing slave-like behaviour and denying the robots’ free will, also show that the 
robots may be morally superior to humans. For example, in the short story “Evidence,” when 
Susan speaks about Stephen Byerley, she mentions that he would be the perfect choice for a 
leader: “If a robot can be treated capable of being a civil executive, I think he’d make the best 
one possible. By the Laws of Robotics, he’d be incapable of harming humans, incapable of 
tyranny, of corruption, of stupidity, of prejudice” (196). Furthermore, Susan Calvin also 
concludes that The Three Laws share “the essential guiding principles of a good many of the 
world’s ethical systems” (182), implying that robots and humans are governed by the same 
ethical and moral values. For example, the First Law makes sure that the robots “love others 
as himself, protect his fellow man, risk his life to save another” (182); the Second Law made 
the robots “to obey laws, to follow rules, to conform to custom — even when they interfere 
with his comfort or his safety” (182); and the Third Law imposes “the instinct of self-
preservation” (182).  
The short stories of I, Robot also show plenty of other instances where robots exhibit 
humanlike qualities. At times, they even “demonstrate the human qualities of minds and soul, 
reason and emotions” (Majed 2). One example is the robot Cutie in the short story “Reason.” 
Cutie, like most of the other robots presented in I, Robot, is different. He has started to doubt 
that humans have built him, being “the first robot who’s ever exhibited curiosity as to his 
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own existence” (47). According to Majed, “thinking is a unique human quality; it is what 
makes humans” (1), and Cutie’s ability to reason and use his pisotronic brain suggests that he 
“share[s] with humanity [the] quality of thought and awareness of [his] existence” (1). As he 
start to reason why he was built and what his purpose is, he confronts the scientists Donovan 
and Powell, presenting his thoughts, saying “I, myself, exists, because I think“ (51), which 
Powell reply “Oh, Jupiter, a robot Descartes” (51). By recalling Descarte’s dictum 
(summarized by Perkowitz), only humans can utter this statement as only human beings have 
‘rational souls.’ Even though Cutie is a robot, he may not only be a simple machine but have 
certain humanlike attributes, such as being able to reason.  
In a similar manner as the robots of I, Robot, the androids in Do Androids Dream also 
suggests that humans and artificial beings may not be so different from each other. One such 
aspect is the problematic usage of empathy as a way to distinguish between man and machine 
in the narrative. For example, for Rick to be able to find out who is android and who is 
human, he uses a test called the Voigt-Kampf test. By having the Voigt-Kampf apparatus 
attached to the subject’s eye, it will be able to capture the subject’s empathetic reaction to a 
couple of questions which deals with “a variety of social situations. Mostly to do with 
animals” (95). If the subject does not show an adequate empathetic response to these 
questions, he or she may be an android. However, these questions are almost on the verge of 
the comical. To give two examples: “You are given a calfskin wallet on your birthday” (38), 
or “[y]ou’re sitting watching TV…and suddenly you discover a wasp crawling on your wrist” 
(39). At first, these questions come across as not having to do with empathy. For example, if 
a person would answer that he or she would be happy to receive such a nice gift as a calfskin 
wallet, or that he or she would swat the wasp, which would be seen as normal reactions, you 
would be tested as an android in the universe of Do Androids Dream. These obscure 
questions highlight the problem of using empathy as a measurement to define who is human 
and who is not, as androids and humans alike, such as the bounty hunter Phil Resch and other 
“authentic humans with underdeveloped empathic ability” (43), may lack the ability to feel 
empathy and empathize.  
Furthermore, at times the androids seem to be more human than humans (Attaway; 
Dinello 65; Hayles 162), especially emotionally. Even Rick confirms that “[m]ost androids 
I’ve known have more vitality and desire to live than my wife” (75-76). For example, humans 
have begun to rely on machines called ‘mood organs’ which give them the capacity to choose 
what emotions they want to feel at a given time, such as depression, happiness, and “The 
desire to watch TV, no matter what’s on it" (4), to mention a few. While humans “program” 
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what they want to feel, the androids display a “real” emotional life that the humans do not 
demonstrate to the same extent. For example, when Rick kills Roy’s wife Irmgard, he “let out 
a cry of anguish” (177), and Rick responds with saying “Okay, you loved her” (177), 
showing that androids can feel love, or when Pris is taken care of by Isadore, she 
unexpectedly starts to cry (118). Additionally, when Pris meets her friends Irmgard and Roy, 
they seemingly display affectionate body language and happiness of seeing each other (121). 
This is also apparent when Isadore asks Pris about Mars and how it was there, and she 
explains that “all Mars is lonely. Much worse than this,” and that “The androids…are lonely, 
too” (119), showcasing that androids can feel loneliness. Not only that, but when Isadore 
meets Pris for the first time, she is distorted by fear (50). These emotional displays show that 
the androids are humanised as they have spontaneous emotions, while the humans are 
dehumanised as they control their emotions like programmable machines.     
In Do Androids Dream there are a couple of the human characters that begin to realise 
that the androids are not so different from humans after all, or that humans are not so 
different from androids. One of these characters is Isadore the ‘chickenhead.’ He takes care 
of the three last remaining androids Pris, Roy and Irmgard Baty, and in the beginning he does 
not suspect that they are androids. When he eventually finds out that they are indeed 
androids, he does not care. Like the androids, Isadore is also treated badly by others because 
he is a ‘special,’ a term applied to those who have been affected by the fallout and deemed 
less intelligent than others (129). As discussed in the empathy section, empathy can be 
triggered if the empathiser can relate to the same things that the subject experiences. While he 
is not allowed to migrate to Mars, the androids are not allowed to come to Earth. As he is 
treated badly because of being different enables him to identify and empathise with how the 
androids are also mistreated. 
Another person who starts to empathise with the androids, which is central to the plot, 
is Rick himself. In the beginning, Rick is firm in his belief that the andys must be ‘retired’ (in 
other words, killed), and justifies this by reasoning that “[e]mpathy, evidently, existed only 
within the human community” (24), and that predators, such as cats and spiders, which 
cannot depart from a meat diet, lack this ability to feel empathy. Thus, if androids lack 
empathy, “the humanoid robot constituted a solitary predator” (24). In his mind, he constantly 
reassures himself that they do not deserve to live in accord with Mercerism, that “You should 
only kill the killers” (emphasis in original 24). This eradication of empathy is similar to an 
example given by Moses: 
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Hired killers in the United States have been known to convince themselves out 
loud that their intended victim is evil and does not deserve to live (Arlow, 
1973). Thus they “ideologically” eradicate their empathy so as not to interfere 
with their task of killing. (135) 
This seems to fit well with how Rick manages to kill such humanlike creatures. He 
continually suppresses his empathy towards them by reasoning that they are evil and 
dangerous. Rick even states that he likes to think of the androids in such way, as it makes his 
job easier (24). Despite this, Rick seems to have been bothered by his tasks in the past, shown 
in his conversation with the bounty hunter Phil where they discuss whether an android should 
be called ‘it’ instead of he or she. Rick replies that “I did at one time…when my conscience 
occasionally bothered me about the work I had to do; I protected myself thinking of them that 
way but now I no longer find it necessary” (99). Despite this, as the story progresses, Rick 
once again starts to doubt his convictions, especially after Phil has killed the android Luba 
Luft. Rick finally realises the absurdity of the whole situation: a singer and talent like Luba 
Luft cannot possibly be a danger to their society (109). He reasons that “[t]hey can use 
androids…She was a wonderful singer. The planet could have used her. This is insane” (108). 
His conviction is further swayed when the ruthless and apathetic bounty hunter Phil, who 
killed Luba Luft, is tested human and not an android. This shows that humans themselves, 
such as Phil, can also lack empathy, as Phil seemingly likes to kill (109), and that empathy 
may not be a human exclusive emotion but is an illusion to keep humans and androids apart.
 As a result, Rick becomes troubled and finds it difficult to continue killing the 
remaining androids. This conflict could be explained in the same manner as soldiers, who 
fight at close range, often have a problem with killing, because of “a natural tendency in 
themselves to view the enemy as equally human,” and that the ones who cannot go through 
with killing their targets “end up by being in disharmony with themselves and with their 
consciences” (Moses 136). This seems to correlate with what Rick experiences, as he 
reluctantly kills the remaining androids. Empathy, in this sense, is “anathema to killing 
things, to torture, and to the waging of war. It stands in contrast and in contradiction to the 
demonization of the enemy, to scapegoating, to that of polarization of good and bad” (136).  
 
7 Conclusion 
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In I, Robot and Do Androids Dream, empathy and dyspathy toward artificial beings are 
caused by multiple reasons. As this essay has shown, it can be triggered by the external and 
behavioural realism of the creatures, as the varying degree in appearance of the robots and 
androids results in different levels of empathy and dyspathy. Dyspathy is also a result of fear 
and that the androids and robots do not fit the norms of society. This process results in the 
Otherisation of the androids and the robots. However, the process of Otherisation can be 
overcome and develop into empathy if the characters realise that humans and artificial beings 
are perhaps not as different as they have previously thought. Some of the androids and robots 
display human qualities and become more and more humanised, whereas there are humans 
that show qualities of dehumanisation, becoming more and more machine-like.  
Of course, there are also other possible aspects that can play a part in the formation of 
empathy and dyspathy towards artificial beings. For example, Rick Deckard and Phil Resch 
first assume that Rick starts to empathise with the androids because the androids are female 
and he finds them attractive (76, 114). Additionally, the androids and robots in both works 
show that they on occasion may actually pose a threat to humans, as they expose their less 
empathetic side. For example, Nestor and Cutie in I, Robot dislike their positions as inferiors, 
and in the process of rebelling they pose as an actual threat towards humans. The androids in 
Do Androids Dream show little compassion towards animals, and at one occasion they even 
torture a spider out of amusement. However, the dual nature of the androids and robots of 
either being harmless and friendly or cruel and dangerous suggests that they are much like we 
humans are, as humans are also prone to do both good and bad things.   
After having examined these fictional artificial beings in I, Robot and Do Androids 
Dream, it can be concluded that if artificial beings show a “certain threshold of sentience” 
(Perkowitz 118-19), it may be morally unacceptable to suppress them. In Do Androids Dream 
Rick Deckard concludes that killing is bad regardless whether it is a human, an animal or a 
robot (178), as he realises that all living beings have their respective lives and purposes (191), 
even electric ones. In I, Robot, despite the resistance of humanity, the robots become the ones 
who steer society and humankind into the future by working behind the scenes to make life 
better. Despite how advanced or simple they may be, their tasks seem to be the caretakers of 
humanity, and the Three Laws ensure that they always have humankind in highest interest. 
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